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Abstract
We determine a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the
production-in-advance type symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly game for the most challenging case of interme-
diate capacities, which was unknown so far. Based on the obtained
equilibrium we show that economic surplus within the production-to-
order type environment is higher than in the respective production-
in-advance type one, and therefore production-to-order should be pre-
ferred to production-in-advance if the mode of production can be in-
fluenced by the government.
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1 Introduction
In one of the basic oligopoly games firms can set prices and quantities at
the same time. This framework was already introduced by Shubik (1955)
and referred by Maskin (1986) as the production-in-advance environment in
which production takes place before sales are realized. Markets of perishable
goods are usually mentioned as examples of advance production in a market.
In contrast in case of production-to-order production takes place after prices
are known.
Maskin (1986) established the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium
for the production-in-advance game under quite general conditions. Assuming
unlimited capacities and linear demand, Levitan and Shubik (1978) computed
the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case of production in advance. In the
same framework Gertner (1986) determined the mixed-strategy equilibrium
under more general conditions. As a part of comparing the equilibrium profits
under production-in-advance with that under production-to-order Tasnádi
(2004, Section 4) and Tasnádi (2019) determined the equilibrium profits also
for the case of unlimited capacities. Recently, Montez and Schutz (2018), as a
part of a lager project on unsold inventories and exploring relations with other
micro-theoretic models, determined the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the
production-in-advance game and pointed out shortcomings of the previous
solutions.1
In Tasnádi (2004) we showed that within the framework of a capacity-
constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly the production-in-advance and the
production-to-order environments result in the same profits. In obtaining this
result we considered the small capacity, the intermediate capacity and the
large capacity cases. Since the small capacity case has a simple solution
in pure strategies (e. g. Tasnádi 2004, Section 3), while the large capacity
case has been solved completely by Montez and Schutz (2018) in this paper
we focus on the most challenging case of intermediate capacities for which
we determine a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. The latter case was
only partially solved in Tasnádi (2004, Section 5), which focused only on the
determination of the equilibrium profits. Furthermore, based on the derived
mixed-strategy equilibrium we can show in this paper that economic surplus
is higher in case of production-to-order than in case of production-in-advance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
framework, Section 3 determines a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
and Section 4 investigates economic surplus.
1For recent theoretical results on the production in advance game we refer the reader
to Bos and Vermeulen (2015) and van den Berg and Bos (2017). For related recent exper-
imental results see Casaburi and Minerva (2011) and Davis (2013).
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the necessary assumptions, notations and already
available results.
Assumption 1. The demand curve D : R+ → R+ is strictly decreasing on
[0, b], identically zero on [b,∞), continuous at b, twice continuously differen-
tiable on (0, b) and concave on [0, b].
We shall denote by a the horizontal intercept of D; i.e. D (0) = a. In
addition, we shall denote by P the inverse demand function.
In our model two firms set their prices and quantities simultaneously.
Assumption 2. Firms 1 and 2 have identical positive unit costs c ∈ (0, b)
up to the same positive capacity constraint k. Each of them sets its price
(p1, p2 ∈ [0, b]) and production quantity (q1, q2 ∈ [0, k]).
Throughout the paper i and j will be used to refer to the two firms; in
particular, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
We employ the efficient rationing by the low-price firm, which occurs in
a market if the consumers can costlessly resell the good to each other or if
the consumers have heterogeneous unit demands and the consumers having
higher reservation prices are served first (for more details we refer to Vives,
1998 and Wolfstetter, 2001), to determine the demand faced by the firms.
Assumption 3. The demand faced by firm i is given by
∆i (p1, q1, p2, q2) =

D (pi) if pi < pj
qi
qi+qj
D (pi) if pi = pj
(D (pi)− qj)+ if pi > pj.
Under Assumption 3 the low-price firm faces the entire demand, firms
with identical prices split the demand in proportion of the firms’ quantity
decisions2 and the high-price firm faces a so-called residual demand, which
equals the demand minus the quantity produced by the low-price firm.
We define the firms’ profit functions as follows:
pii ((p1, q1) , (p2, q2)) = pi min {∆i (p1, q1, p2, q2) , qi} − cqi
2The essential property of the tie-breaking rule employed in this paper is that firm i’s
demand is strictly increasing in firm i’s own quantity (see also Maskin, 1986). In fact,
any other tie-breaking rule satisfying the latter property does the job. Nevertheless, the
tie-breaking rule specified in Assumption 3 reflects a larger visibility by consumers and a
lower risk of of being out-of-stock in case of a larger production.
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for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
Three special prices play an important role in the analysis. We define p∗
to be the price that clears the firms’ aggregate capacity from the market if
such a price exists, and zero otherwise. That is,
p∗ =
{
D−1 (2k) if D (0) > 2k
0 if D (0) ≤ 2k.
The function
pir (p) = (p− c) (D (p)− k)
equals a firm’s residual profit whenever its opponent sells k and D (p) ≥ k.
Let p = arg maxp∈[c,b] pir (p) and pi = pir (p). Clearly, p∗ and p are well defined
whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Finally, let p = c+ pi/k, that is
p is the price at which a firm is indifferent between selling it entire capacity
and maximizing profits on the residual demand curve.
Maskin (1986, Theorem 1) demonstrated that the production in advance
game possesses an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In the following, a mixed
strategy is a probability measure defined on the σ-algebra of Borel measurable
sets on S = [c, b]× [0, k]. A mixed-strategy equilibrium (µ∗1, µ∗2) is determined
by the following two conditions:
pi1 ((p1, q1) , µ
∗
2) ≤ pi∗1, pi2 (µ∗1, (p2, q2)) ≤ pi∗2 (1)
holds true for all (p1, q1) , (p2, q2) ∈ S, and
pi1 ((p
∗
1, q
∗
1) , µ
∗
2) = pi
∗
1, pi2 (µ
∗
1, (p
∗
2, q
∗
2)) = pi
∗
2 (2)
holds true µ∗1-almost everywhere and µ∗2-almost everywhere, where pi∗1, pi∗2
stand for the equilibrium profits corresponding to (µ∗1, µ∗2). In addition, it
can be verified that a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies exists by
applying Theorem 6∗ of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
For a strategy µ let µp stand for the projection of probability measure µ to
the set of prices; that is, µp (B) = µ (B × [0, k]) for any Borel set B ⊆ [c, b].
For a given µp we shall denote the respective cumulative distribution by F ;
that is, F (p) = µp ([c, p]).
For the case of small capacities, i.e. p∗ ≥ p, the game has a unique equi-
librium in pure strategies in which the firms produce at their capacity limits
and set the market-clearing price (e.g. Tasnádi, 2004, Proposition 2). The
mixed-strategy equilibrium for the case of large capacities, i.e. D(c) ≤ k,
has been determined recently by Montez and Schutz (2018) in which the
firms charge prices above their common unit costs. Therefore, in this paper
we focus on the open and most challenging case of intermediate capacities,
i.e. p > max {p∗, c} for which we had established the following proposition
earlier.
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Proposition 1 (Tasnádi, 2004, Proposition 4). Let Assumptions 1, 2 and
3 be satisfied. If p > max {p∗, c}, then for any symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium (µ, µ) of the production-in-advance game, we have
F (p) = µp
([
p, p
])
= µ
([
p, p
]
, {k}) = (p− c) k − pi
p (2k −D (p)) (3)
for any p ∈ [ p, p).
3 Mixed-strategy equilibrium
We search for a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a special form by
assuming that at prices p ∈ [c, p̂] ⊂ [c, b] at most one quantity s(p) ∈ [0, k]
will be produced in equilibrium, where p̂ = inf {p ∈ [c, b] | µp ((p, b]) = 0}.
Therefore, a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be given by the triple (p̂, s, F ).
Furthermore, we assume that s is strictly decreasing and continuously differ-
entiable on [p, p̂). From Proposition 1 we already know that s(p) = k for all
p ∈ [ p, p).
Assume that (p̂, s, F ) is associated with a symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium (µ, µ). Since s and F are known for all p ∈ [ p, p) in what follows we
consider without loss of generality only prices such that p ≥ p. Furthermore,
let f(p) = F ′(p), where F is differentiable.
Suppose that F has an atom at p. If s (p) > D (p) /2, then profits at
price (p − ε, k) would be higher; a contradiction. If s (p) ≤ D (p) /2, then
the expected residual demand at price p will be larger than D (p) − k, and
therefore the firms’ can achieve higher profits at a price p+ε than at price p;
a contradiction. Hence, F cannot have an atom at p. Furthermore, it can be
verified that F cannot have a gap ranging from p to p + ε because then for
any price in [p, p+ ε] the optimal quantity of production would equal k and
pi1((p, q), µ) would be strictly concave on [p, p+ ε] leading to a contradiction.3
We shall denote by r∗ ∈ [p, p̂] the unique price at which s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2
if such a price exists, otherwise we have s(p) > D(p)/2 for all p ∈ [p, p̂].4
Proceeding in a similar vein as in the proof Lemma 6 in Tasnádi (2004), it
can be shown that there exists a price p′ ∈ (p, p̂) such that F is even atomless
on (p, p′) and that there is no gap in (p, p′). Temporarily, we assume that F
3This is just a sketch of the proof. The full proof just requires the repetition of the
steps appearing in the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 4 in Tasnádi (2004).
4This has to be shown and in the current version we are just searching for a mixed-
strategy equilibrium satisfying this property.
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is even atomless on (p, p̂). Then firm 1’s profit equals
pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1− F (p)) + p
∫ p
p
min
{
(D(p)− s(r))+, q} dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
min
{
(D(p)− k))+, q} dF (r)− cq (4)
for any p ∈ (p, p̂) and any q ∈ [0,min{k,D(p)}], where we have already
taken into account that D(p) < s(p) = q does not make sense since then
the firms produce a superfluous amount for sure. Note that we cannot have
q = s(p) < (D(p)− k)+ since this would result in even less profits than
choosing pure-strategy (p,D (p)). Hence, in what follows we can assume that
q ≥ (D(p)− k)+. Therefore, (4) simplifies to
pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1− F (p)) + p
∫ p
p
min {D(p)− s(r), q} dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k)dF (r)− cq. (5)
In determining ∂pi1
∂q
((p, q), µ) first let us consider the case in which D(p)−
s(p) < q, and therefore D(p)− s(r) < q for all r ∈ [p, p] since s is (assumed
to be) strictly decreasing. Then it follows that
∂pi1
∂q
((p, q), µ) = p (1− F (p))− c. (6)
Second, we consider the case in whichD(p)−s(p) > q. SinceD(p)−s(p) >
q ≥ D(p) − k = D(p) − s(p) and s is continuous and strictly decreasing on[
p, p̂
]
there exists a unique r ∈ [p, p) such that D(p) − s(r) = q. Then
r = s−1 (D(p)− q). We denote the functional relationship between q and r
by r(q). Clearly, r(q) is strictly decreasing. Now (5) can be written as
pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1− F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
qdF (r) +
p
∫ r(q)
p
D(p)− s(r)dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k)dF (r)− cq, (7)
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from which we get
∂pi1
∂q
((p, q), µ) = p (1− F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
dF (r)− pqf(r(q))r′(q) +
p (D(p)− s(r(q))) f(r(q))r′(q)− c
= p (1− F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
dF (r)− pqf(r(q))r′(q) +
pqf(r(q))r′(q)− c
= p (1− F (r(q)))− cq. (8)
Summarizing (6) and (8), we get
∂pi1
∂q
((p, q), µ) =
{
p (1− F (p))− c if D(p)− s(p) < q,
p (1− F (r(q)))− c if D(p)− s(p) > q ≥ D(p)− k.
(9)
It can be verified that p (1− F (p))− c = 0 and
p
(
1− (p− c) k − pi
p (2k −D (p))
)
− c > 0 (10)
for all p ∈ [p, b] \ {p}. Since F does not have an atom at price p we have
pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pi
for all q ∈ [D(p)− k, k].
Suppose that we have (p + ε) (1− F (p+ ε)) − c > 0. Then we would
have s(p+ ε) = k and F (p) should equal the left-hand side of (3). However,
it can be verified that the expression on the left-hand side of (3) will start
decreasing before achieving value 1. If we have s(p) = k even on a maximal
right-open interval [p, p+ ε), then from (9) it would follow that there will be
a gap starting from p + ε. Since F (p + ε) < 1 by the strict concavity of the
profit function above the gap we can arrive to a contradiction.5
Suppose that we have (p+ε) (1− F (p+ ε))− c < 0. Then we would have
s(p + ε) = D(p + ε) − k on an interval [p, p+ ε), and therefore the residual
demand starting just above p would be more favorable, and thus letting firm
1 achieve higher profits than pi.
5This and the paragraph after the next just contains a sketch of how we can show
that in case of a mixed-strategy equilibrium we have to follow the steps starting from the
second paragraph from this one. However, it is not needed to demonstrate that the derived
mixed strategy is a symmetric equilibrium one.
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Assume that we have p (1− F (p))− c = 0 for all p ∈ [p, r∗) resulting for
any q ∈ [D(p)− s(p), k] in the same profits by (9). Then
F (p) = 1− c
p
(11)
for all p ∈ [p, r∗), and therefore the firms never produce less than D(p)−s(p)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗) by p (1− F (r(q)))− c > 0 and (9). Now from (5) and (11)
we can derive s on the respective interval by solving
pi = pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pq
c
p
+ p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− s(r)) c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k) f(r)dr − cq
= pD(p)
(
1− c
p
)
− pk
(
1− c
p
)
− p
∫ p
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr,(12)
where we have taken (9) together with our observations from this paragraph
into account. Let
S(p) =
∫ p
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr (13)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗). Then we have
S(p) = 0 and S ′(p) = s(p)
c
p2
(14)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗). From (12) we get
S(p) =
pD(p)
(
1− c
p
)
− pk
(
1− c
p
)
− pi
pc
(15)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗) from which by differentiation we obtain S ′ and finally by
simple rearrangements
s(p) = D′(p)
(
p2
c2
− p
c
)
+D(p)
1
p
+
pi
c
. (16)
It can be verified that s′(p) is negative, and thus s is indeed strictly decreas-
ing.
Clearly, both S and s can be extended through equations (13) and (14)
for prices higher than r∗, respectively, where for p ≥ r∗ equation (12) takes
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the following from
pi = pi1 ((p, q), µ) = pq
c
p
+ p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr + p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p)− s(r)) c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k) f(r)dr − cq
= pD(p)
(
1− c
r∗
)
− pk
(
1− c
p
)
−
p
∫ r∗
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr + p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (17)
For any p ≥ r∗ let
Q(p) =
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (18)
Then we have
Q(r∗) = 0 and Q′(p) = s(p)
c
p2
(19)
for any p ∈ [r∗, r′), where r′ is uniquely defined by the implicit equation
s(r′) = D(r′)− k. Clearly, setting prices above r′ does no make sense, since
playing these pure strategies against mixed-strategy µs,F will result in less
profits than pure-strategy (p,D(p)− k). From (17) we get
Q(p) =
pD(p)
(
1− c
r∗
)− pk (1− c
p
)
− pS(r∗)− pi
pc
(20)
for any p ∈ [r∗, r′, ) from which by differentiation we obtain Q′ and finally
by simple rearrangements s(p). With a slight abuse of notation we will still
denote the obtained function by s(p) on p ∈ (r∗, r′) though as it will turn
out the firms will not produce at prices above r∗. These extensions will be
helpful for us in the price interval [r∗, r′].
Now we will verify that having an atom at price r∗ of mass c/r∗ = 1 −
F (r∗) completes a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. We shall denote the
just completely specified price distribution by F . Assume that firm 2 plays
the same mixed strategy. Then we already know that for any p ∈ [p, r∗)
producing an amount of q = s(p) results in pi profit by Proposition 1 and
the definition of s on p ∈ [p, r∗) by (14). Furthermore, for any p ∈ [p, p)
producing less than k results in less profits then pi, and for any p ∈ [p, r∗)
and any quantity [D(p)− s(p), k] profits equal pi, while they are strictly less
for quantities less than D(p)− s(p) by (9).
We claim that in the derived symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium firms
produce at price r∗ an amount of s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2. Suppose that they would
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produce more than D(r∗)/2. Then their will be superfluous production at
price r∗, and therefore by the continuity of profits for prices below r∗ prof-
its at price r∗ would be less then at prices r∗ − ε if ε is sufficiently small.
Suppose that they would produce an amount of q∗ less than D(r∗)/2. Then
pi1 ((p, q), µs,F )) is continuous at (q∗, r∗), and therefore pi1 ((r∗, q∗), µs,F )) < pi;
a contradiction. Thus, we must have indeed s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2. By the left con-
tinuity at price p∗ it follows that pi1 ((r∗, D(r∗)/2), µs,F )) = pi.
To verify that the triple (p̂, s, F ) specified in the previous paragraphs
specifies a strategy of a symmetric mixed-equilibrium it remains to be shown
that prices above r∗ combined with any quantity q ∈ [0, k] result in less
profits than pi.
The profit function of firm 1 in response to firm 2 playing the mixed
strategy associated with (p̂, s, F ) for prices p ≥ r∗ equals
pi1 ((p, q), µs,F ) = pmin
{
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
, q
}
c
r∗
+ p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p)− s(r)) c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k) f(r)dr − cq (21)
from which we get6
∂pi1
∂q
((p, q), µ) =
{
−c if D(p)− D(r∗)
2
< q,
p c
r∗ − c if D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
> q ≥ D(p)− k (22)
for any p > p̂ = r∗. Since pc/r∗− c > 0 we get that quantity q = D(p)− D(r∗)
2
results in the highest profit in (21) for any price p > p̂ = r∗.
Hence, we define the profit function of firm 1 at the best quantities for
prices p ≥ r∗ by
pi∗(p) = p
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)
c
r∗
+ p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p)− s(r)) c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k) f(r)dr − c
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)
(23)
It can be verified that pi∗(p) is strictly concave, and it would be straightfor-
ward to check that the derivative pi∗(p) is non-positive at r∗, which unfortu-
nately does not result in a manageable inequality. Therefore, we consider the
6Note that (9) is only valid for (p, q) ∈ (p, p̂)× [0, k], while here we need the first order
condition for p > p̂.
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equality in (17) defining s and let us denote by
pis(p) = p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr + p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p)− s(r)) c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p)− k) f(r)dr = pi (24)
for prices p ∈ [r∗, r′]. Clearly, dpis(p)/dp = 0 for any p ∈ [r∗, r′] by the
definition of s, which we will utilize by considering ∆(p) =
pi∗(p)− pis(p) = p
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)
c
r∗
− c
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)
− p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr
=
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)(
p
c
r∗
− c
)
− p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (25)
Then
∆′(p) = D′(p)
(
p
c
r∗
− c
)
+
(
D(p)− D(r
∗)
2
)
c
r∗
−∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr − ps(p) c
p2
. (26)
By substituting r∗ for p in (26) and taking s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2 into consideration
we get ∆′(r∗) = 0, which implies dpi∗(p)/dp = 0.
To conclude the following proposition contains our result on the mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth game
for the case of intermediate capacities.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 be satisfied. If p > max {p∗, c},
then a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (µ, µ) is given by the following
equilibrium price distribution
F (p) = µp
([
p, p
])
=

0 if 0 ≤ p < p,
(p−c)k−pi
p(2k−D(p)) if p ≤ p < p,
1− c
p
if p ≤ p < p̂ = r∗, and
1 if p̂ = r∗ ≤ p ≤ b
(27)
and by the ‘supply’ function s(p) given by s(p) = k for all p ∈ [p, p] and
determined by (16) for all p ∈ [p, p̂].
To illustrate Proposition 2 we provide an example.
Example 1. Let D(p) = 1− p, k = 0.4 and c = 0.1.
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Then one can obtain that p = 0.35, pi = 0.0625, p = 0.25625,
s(p) = 1.625 − 10p2
for all p ∈ [p, p̂], where p̂ = 0.36134060117684275, and
F (p) =

0 if 0 ≤ p < p,
0.4p−0.12
(p−0.2)p if p ≤ p < p,
1− 0.1
p
if p ≤ p < p̂, and
1 if p̂ ≤ p ≤ 1.
Firm 1’s profits in response to firm 2 playing its equilibrium strategy given
above can be seen in Figure 1 in which prices range from p = 0.25625 to 0.45
(well beyond p̂ = 0.36134060117684275), moreover the full quantity range
from 0 to 0.4 is admitted.
Figure 1: Profit function pi1 ((p, q), µs,F )
4 Economic surplus
In this section we compare the production-in-advance game with the
production-to-order game based on the their economic (i.e. Marshallian) sur-
pluses in equilibrium, which is given by
ES(p1, q1, p2, q2) =
{ ∫ min{D(pj),q1+q2}
0
P (q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) > qi,∫ min{D(pi),qi}
0
P (q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) ≤ qi,
12
Figure 2: Economic surplus
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b. We illustrate the economic surplus in Figure 2.
We would like to emphasize that if sales occur at the higher price, then the
economic surplus is determined at the higher price.
It is well-known that for small capacities in the pure-strategy equilibrium
of the production-to-order game the firms set the market-clearing price, and
thus the production-to-order and the production-in-advance versions of the
game have the same outcome meaning also that their economic surpluses are
identical.
For large capacities in the equilibrium of the production-to-order game
firms set prices equal to unit costs, while in the equilibrium of the production-
in advance game firms set prices above unit costs with positive probability
(see for instance, Montez and Schutz, 2018). Therefore, the economic surplus
is higher in the production-to-order game than in the production-in-advance
game.
For the case of intermediate capacities (i.e. p > max {p∗, c}) we know
from Vives (1986) that there is only an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed
strategies with cumulative distribution function
G (p) =
(p− c) k − pi
(p− c) (2k −D (p)) (28)
for any p ∈ [p, p]. We will rely on (28) in the proof of our next proposition
stating that in case of intermediate capacities economic surplus is higher in
the production-to-order game than in the production-in-advance game.
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Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, p > max {p∗, c} and that the
equilibrium given in Proposition 2 is played, the economic surplus is higher
in the production-to-order game, then in the production-in-advance game.
Proof. First, note that the economic surplus related to the symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium given in Proposition 2 is lower than in the case when
both firms play mixed strategies F given by (27) in the production-to-order
game, since then the loss in economic surplus due to both underproduction
and overproduction is eliminated.
Second, since F stochastically dominates G the respective cumulative
distribution function of the higher price F 2 also stochastically dominates G2.
Since the later cumulative distribution functions determine the economic
surpluses the statement of the proposition holds true.
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